I suspect it's what several states are doing in regard to the federal government stepping all over the 9th and 10th amendment.
IMO, until the 17th amendment is repealed the state will remain unrepresented and continue to lose 9th and 10th rights.
Until the 17th amendment the states appointed 2 senators. The House of Representatives was, and does, represent the interest of the people.
The Senate, appointed by state legislatures, represent the interest of the state.
Presently, with the Senate elected by the people, the interest of the state is not represented.
Now, with no representation, the federal government can mandate all sorts of things on the state.
Key to correcting our political situation is two fold IMO.
First, lobbyist, and second, representation for the state.
The 17 amendment was passed in 1911, but was really an effect of the war of northern aggression, 1860-1865.
Text of the 17th amendment:
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.
Here is how the Federalist Paper, no.62, regarded the purpose of the senate:
Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the States. It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial; and that the peculiar defense which it involves in favor of the smaller States, would be more rational, if any interests common to them, and distinct from those of the other States, would otherwise be exposed to peculiar danger. But as the larger States will always be able, by their power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of this prerogative of the lesser States, and as the faculty and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable, it is not impossible that this part of the Constitution may be more convenient in practice than it appears to many in contemplation.
