Frustration

[williamlayton]

There are many things, in the history of the Civil War which leave me frustrated--on both sides of the line.
The one thing I will never understand was the mind-set of the Union Army after Gettysburg. Why did the Army just LET Lee retreat with all of his men and equipment. They could have cut him to ribbons and reduced the Army of northern virginia to a platoon and never had to worry about it again.
Blessings

[BUGEYE]

There are many things, in the history of the Civil War which leave me frustrated--on both sides of the line.
The one thing I will never understand was the mind-set of the Union Army after Gettysburg. Why did the Army just LET Lee retreat with all of his men and equipment. They could have cut him to ribbons and reduced the Army of northern virginia to a platoon and never had to worry about it again.
Blessings

did they think that Lee was just "playing" at war and would go home and quit?
interesting point though.

[us920669]

Meade had accomplished what no one else had, he destroyed the myth of Lee's invincibility and decided not to press his luck.  His army was no doubt more difficult to handle than Lee's and if one element had walked into a trap and been destroyed, it would have wiped out all his gains.  He probably found it incredible that Lee would just pack up and go home without trying to salvage something from his first appearance north of the MDL.

[williamlayton]

Weaponry and war had changed--we saw that in 1846.
Movement was much better. Some still wanted to wage static war.
A following calvary with the weapons available could have hit and run Lee on his trip back--delaying his retreat and slaughtering his troops.
I really don't see as much risk--in the face of the chance to wipe out the army.
The North--as was the South--was incredibly shy in pressing home an advantage.
Blessings

[subdjoe]

Meade had accomplished what no one else had, he destroyed the myth of Lee's invincibility and decided not to press his luck.  His army was no doubt more difficult to handle than Lee's and if one element had walked into a trap and been destroyed, it would have wiped out all his gains.  He probably found it incredible that Lee would just pack up and go home without trying to salvage something from his first appearance north of the MDL.

Keep in mind that losses on both side were about equal.  Both had just over 23,000 killed, wounded, captured, or missing.  That was a full third of the ANV, and a quarter of the AoP.

Lee had drawn his army into a strong defensive position, some say hoping for an attack by Meade, and it was raining quite heavily on 4 July.  When Meade did not attack, Lee was able to withdraw in good order while keeping up a strong rear guard.  If the ANV had been routed, then a strong pursuit would have been well justified.  But against an army that was still in good order, in many cases spoiling for another fight, and well versed in defensive warfare, Meads decision to not mount a strong pursuit may have been a good one.

Also, Meade had only been in command of the AoP for, what, two days? before the battle?  He didn't really know his army.  His men, after three days of fighting, were short on supplies - including, somewhat ironically, shoes - and were not really in condition to face another stand up fight.  Granted, the ANV was not in any better shape, but fighting with their backs to a rain swollen river may have given them the incentive to break the AoP.

[bkraft]

Meade was smart enough to realize that sometimes good enough is good enough.  Mead was a good solid reliable commander. True genius would have attacked Lee and trapped his army against the river and destroyed it piece meal in the open field. True genius being Grant or Sherman.

[subdjoe]

Again, the ANV was retreating in good order and had a strong rear guard.  When stalled at the river, Lee set a strong defensive perimeter.  It wasn't a straggling hoard to be "destroyed piece meal in the open."

Meade, though his cavalry, had good intelligence on the movements and disposition of Confederate troops.  Note that he was NOT cashiered after Grant took command of all the US Army and held command of the AoP until it was disbanded in June, 1865.

Meade was smart enough to realize that sometimes good enough is good enough.  Mead was a good solid reliable commander. True genius would have attacked Lee and trapped his army against the river and destroyed it piece meal in the open field. True genius being Grant or Sherman.

[bkraft]

As I said Mead was a good solid commander, who made a sound military decision based upon the information at his disposal at the time. Mead was not of the bulldog mentallity that Grant or even Sherman was. Neither of which if judged by their performances througout the war would have given Lee a pass. Cavalary raids, harassing actions all in an attempt to get one of Lees commanders to take the bait and give the opening that was needed. Once engaged never let go, flanking never retreating always moving to the side never giving the ANV breathing room. That was Grant's M.O.
if the application had been employed sooner, who knows? If the roles were reversed do you think Jackson would have hung back, Longstreet maybe, but Jackson... I don't see it.

[subdjoe]

True, Grant, and to a lesser extent Sherman, had a way of throwing bodies onto a fire until it was out.  Lee's corps commanders, on the other hand were masters of the defensive fight and Lee was bold enough to separate his forces if needed to hit an attack in the flank while maintaining a solid front. 

Even if the AoP had clung like burrs to the ANV and hit it hard at the river, there is a good chance that it would have broken itself on a Confederate breakwater.   I think Meade, far from being just a solid commander, had the brilliance to see that with the condition his army was in it might not have the stamina to take on an army that was fighting for its life. And had the fortitude to not waste it in an iffy attack, no matter what hanging back would do to his reputation. 

As I said Mead was a good solid commander, who made a sound military decision based upon the information at his disposal at the time. Mead was not of the bulldog mentallity that Grant or even Sherman was. Neither of which if judged by their performances througout the war would have given Lee a pass. Cavalary raids, harassing actions all in an attempt to get one of Lees commanders to take the bait and give the opening that was needed. Once engaged never let go, flanking never retreating always moving to the side never giving the ANV breathing room. That was Grant's M.O.
if the application had been employed sooner, who knows? If the roles were reversed do you think Jackson would have hung back, Longstreet maybe, but Jackson... I don't see it.

[ironglow]

   Bill;
   I guess everyone has a few pennies to invest here..everyone else's as good or better than mine..
  We should recall that Lee was actually Lincoln's first choice.  However, Lee remained loyal to Virginia, so Lincoln was forced to take "Hobbes' choice".
  All the early leaders of "The Army of the Potomac", were obviously very tenative.  many thought that MacClellan could have ended it immediately after the Sharpsburg/Antietam scrap...but he delayed and let Lee cross the river unmolested.
  If I recall correctly, lincoln went down to Mac's headquarters and scolded Mac about "acting like an old lady shooing geese across a creek"  Had the northern generals been a bit more aggressive, perhaps many lives would have been spared on both sides (due to a shortened war).
  Finally, Lincoln had to face the inevitable..pull in the winning Grant, from the west.
  Grant realized that the union had 2 great advantages,,industry and manpower..and he used them up freely.  Some accused him of being unnecessarily brutal, and perhaps this is true....   just my 2 pennies..

[williamlayton]

It truely IS a what if thing we have going.
I can appreciate all who would defend the actions of Meade.
I have to give in to the thought--not sure it is the most prevelant---or, correct---no one knows for sure---that Meade was unsure of his command and, even, his authority.
He was cast in without the ability to think thru a solution--much less a complete plan.
I will also give great value to the thought that Lee was the master on the field--both sides. I give him some amount of grace for Pickets debacle---He was near a broken man without a doubt it was a last gasp, hope and prayer.
I can't give myownself much room to be to critical---I  am looking at it from a much different angle.
That said---I will always be critical of him for not following up and issueing the coup.
Blessings

[deadrabbit]

After days of fighting, maybe both sides were sick of all the death, fighting, and were just glad to end the fight? There may not have been much fight left in the soldiers.

[Swampman]

True genius being Grant or Sherman.

The only thing either possessed was manpower.  The South had none.  New York state alone had more manpower than the entire South.  I don't believe the North ever fielded an effective general officer.  Lee had a heart attack at Gettysburg and was under the weather.  Meade wasn't much of a leader he just took advantage of Lee's blunder.  Longstreet could have won the battle if given the reins.
 
http://toappomattox.wordpress.com/2011/10/21/old-gloomy-pete-the-controversial-general-james-longstreet/
 

[ironglow]

True genius being Grant or Sherman.

The only thing either possessed was manpower.  The South had none.  New York state alone had more manpower than the entire South.  I don't believe the North ever fielded an effective general officer.  Lee had a heart attack at Gettysburg and was under the weather.  Meade wasn't much of a leader he just took advantage of Lee's blunder.  Longstreet could have won the battle if given the reins.
 
http://toappomattox.wordpress.com/2011/10/21/old-gloomy-pete-the-controversial-general-james-longstreet/

''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
    Although the South had the star generals in Lee & Jackson, I must disagree that the North "never fielded an effective general".  Obviously, Grant was effective, and he proved it.  Yes, he was more wasteful than Lee with his men and materiel,
but that is part of generalship...logistics.  Another general who was quite effective before, during and after that war, was Sheridan.  At the outset of the conflict, the north lagged badly in the quality of it's cavalry but Sheridan brought them into effective competition.
   A third effective officer whose exploits brought him a meteoric rise was Gen G A Custer.  He was very effective in conflict but perhaps demonstrating too much elan.  This propensity was to cost him dearly abut a decade later..

[Swampman]

None of my research has lead me to that conclusion.  The South had dozens of brillant leaders.  They just didn't have anyone to lead.  By mid-war half the southern soldiers had gone home or were missing.  The North just rolled us up like an old carpet.  The more we killed the more that came to invade.  Then they declared war on women and children.  That was the end for us.

[williamlayton]

I am kinda on Swampy's side on this. The South, I think, held the edge in leadership. The traditions of the South were pointed to this kind of career.
I remember reading, somewhere, that all of the Northern leadership was particularly political at the beginning.
All of the General leadership of the army was historically Southern.
Blessings

[rio grande]

Might as well ask why General  Beauregard didn't pursue the yankee Army into Washington DC after the first battle of Bull Run.
Lots of missed opportunities on both sides.

[williamlayton]

Yes. Although I will admit that the South could ill afford the loss of men that an offensive campaign brings to the table.
Another funny thought--if, funny is a good word on a subject such as this--is that the first Union victory was not a victory but a draw.
Just as sad he knew what the South was going to do and where they all were and still sat on his heinie and almost lost.
I think it just proves the point & magnifies the situation, that with all of the poor leadership in the North & Blunders for the first two years of the war--the South had, really, no way to win the war from the beginning.
Blessings