didn't say they wouldn't fight said once most communications knocked out , they would be in disarray and surrender. Additionally we have Air and Sea superiority. They are in military service as a Job. It's either join the Army or work the Farm, the majority don't do it for love and honor of country. They do it to eat. And as I stated earlier and still hold to my statement - it would take less than 6 days. The rest would be mop up.
- My 2 cents
Fargo and the PACOM war planners have studied North Korea in detail. It is their job.
Here is a military white paper of one possible and most likely scenario...
Rear Adm. (Ret.) Stephen H. Baker
Center for Defense Information
Colin Robinson
CDI Research Analyst
The official South Korean and U.S. war plan, Operations Plan 5027, currently calls for a
regrouping phrase after halting the initial invasion, which would probably happen amid the
layered defense lines north of and around Seoul, followed by a full-scale invasion of North
Korea to seize Pyongyang and abolish the DPRK as an entity, reunifying the Peninsula under
South Korean control.52 The DPRK would come under heavy attack from the U.S. B-1 and B-
52 long-range bombers, and plans exist for the Marine Corps to use a major portion of its
strength to launch amphibious assaults to cut the DPRK's narrow waist in two.
How A Battle Might Unfold
The course of such a scenario is impossible to predict with any surety, but using available
evidence the following seems likely. After a preparatory artillery barrage, DPRK forces would
aim to drive infantry attacks supported by armor through the approach routes discussed above.
Given the mass of prepared defenses, the unbroken, and amply manned, defense line across the
DMZ (in stark contrast with the invasion of 1950), allied equipment superiority, superior allied
knowledge of the battlefield achieved by advanced reconnaissance and surveillance equipment,
and the parlous state of the North Korean military after the setbacks and famine of the 1990s,
virtually all assessments made in the last few years indicate that an advance would be stopped
before South Korea were overrun.
A successful DPRK advance would require breaking multiple South Korean lines even as the South
Korean reserves, capable of establishing further replacement defense lines, started to arrive.
Historically, rapid successful breakthrough attacks against prepared defenses are rare. When armies
in World War II tried to drive through prepared defenses, advance rates were rarely more than four to
five kilometers a day, andusually less than that – sometimes only about one kilometer a day against
heavily prepared defenses, such as the allied attack on the Siegfried Line.
Given the mass of combat power the U.S. and South Korea have available, both in forward stationed forces
and in reserve, exposed invasion forces that became slowed or halted would be in dire straits from the defense
lines in front of them and to their flanks, as well as indirect fire from artillery. Given the limited capabilities of
the DPRK Air Force – larger in absolute terms than the U.S. and South Korean air forces on the Peninsula
but comprised of mostly obsolete aircraft manned by ill-trained pilots – U.S. and South Korean aircraft would
also soon be inflicting severe damage upon invading forces from the air without significant interference.
The U.S. forces rushing to reinforce the defense would also be substantial. Two brigades’ worth
of equipment stored in and near Korea for the Army and Marines could be rapidly manned by
airlifted troops. And there are already nearly 300 combat aircraft in Korea and Japan, including
the air wing of the carrier usually stationed at Yokosuka in Japan. An armored battalion task
force from the 1st Infantry Division’s brigade at Fort Riley, Kansas, is currently in Korea, and
while most of the 1st Infantry Division remains focused on the Persian Gulf, its parent brigade in
Kansas stands ready to reinforce the U.S. position in Korea. A National Guard earmarked for
the Korean Peninsula, the 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized) from California, is also
apparently alerting elements to prepare to deploy. A U.S. bomber deployment to Guam was
announced in late February 2003, and by March 10 17 B-1 and B-52 heavy bombers had
arrived at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. The nearest Marine forces, for example, are based
in Okinawa, relatively close by, and at least partially sealift-able by their associated amphibious
ships based in Sasebo, Japan. With the resident carrier Kitty Hawk now returning to homeport
in Yokosuka, Japan, the carrier Carl Vinson from the U.S. West Coast is assigned for Korean
duty and will be holding station in the area. At least one heavy division is planned to be shipped
to Korea in the event of war, as well as the 25th Infantry Division (Light) based in Hawaii.
It is clear that in any conflict with North Korea, U.S. forces will emerge victorious. The cost of
the victory is another matter – indeed, there is a tremendous risk of loss of lives and massive
destruction. Some military estimates put the civilian and military toll in the first day as high as 1
million. PACOM has a requirement to keep the Korean War Plan up to date and viable. Fargo is in
charge of executing this war plan, which is focused on neutralizing the threat from North Korea
while keeping the loss of life among his forces and South Korean civilians (or those from any
other country North Korea could reach) to an absolute minimum. Ruling out the horrible option
of tactical nuclear weapons in the DMZ, what tactics could be used that would be the most
successful and what could be a plausible estimate of casualties?
One caveat is that such estimates are always wrong. Second, Fargo is known to think that the
loss of only 10 percent of the earlier (1 million) estimate would be unacceptable.
For the above reason, the tactic of a lightning, “Blitzkreig” strike by the United States and South
Korea could be considered by U.S. military leaders as the best option.
The goal would be to neutralize as much of the threNorth Korean soldiers
suffer from malnutrition and rarely train due to scarcity of fuel and ammunition. They are
equipped with largely obsolete weapons with limited range that have been degrading for years.
at before missile batteries could be manned, rocket and artillery platforms could be rolled out of
bunkers, aircraft could be wheeled out of hangers, and Scud missile launchers could be armed
and set up. In other words, PACOM would want to demolish the immediate threat before fingers
could reach the launch buttons.
As previously mentioned, the U.S. capability exists to hit more than 1,000 North Korean targets
in a first night of attack. Specifically, the United States would want to destroy hundreds of
targets in the first hour from the air, as well as relying on South Korean artillery and rocket
batteries positioned along the DMZ. It would be essential to stun key DPRK units, particularly
those responsible for long-range artillery and aircraft, before they could react. Patriot missile
batteries in South Korea and Japan also would play a critical role in defense from any incoming
missiles. There are at least 11 batteries in South Korea and 27 in various locations throughout
Japan. (Both countries are interested in upgrading to enhanced versions with greater range and
improved radar tracking capabilities.)
U.S. intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance assets already are consistently updating the
high-value target list in North Korea. At the top of this list are the North Korean multiple rocket
launchers and artillery and troop positions heavily concentrated along the DMZ. The United
States can locate most of the North Korean underground shelters beneath the DMZ and
hundreds of other military targets farther north. For example, the critical assembly facility,
research reactor, graphite reactors, radiochemistry laboratory, and fuel fabrication facility at
Yongbyon have all been mapped out in precise detail. Weaponeers have decided what the
optimum ordnance and approach is for each target set, from caving in entrances and exits to
underground artillery batteries, to destroying MiG aircraft in revetted hangers, to causing
reactors to collapse upon themselves to limit radioactive release.
The 700,000-man South Korean Army, as noted above, is well trained and has modern,
reliable equipment. And as mentioned, they have fortified, mined and physically blocked all
routes that North Korean infantry would try to use if there were any thrust south.
A massive, overwhelming strike could eliminate any chance for a counter-attack from the North
and enable a surge forward to start the next phase of a U.S.-South Korean offensive – taking
control of the key military bases and positions of the leadership in Pyongyang.
If Fargo’s war plan, as envisioned above, was successful in the first days of a conflict, it is
conceivable that up to 90 percent of the immediate threat to South Korea could be eliminated,
and the prime objective of rendering the North ineffective and unable to militarily respond
achieved. And the predictions of horrendous mass casualties would be wrong. It is as plausible
that a preemptive “Blitzkrieg” could even hold down allied casualties to an acceptable minimum.
But such a campaign represents a risky course and the consequences always could be far
worse.
